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Abstract 
Gul’s (1991) theory of disappointment aversion (DA) has several attractive features, 
being intuitive, analytically tractable, and parsimonious. In spite of this, the DA model 
has received little attention in practical applications, which may be partly due to the 
absence of a procedure to elicit the model. We show how the trade-off method, developed 
by Wakker and Deneffe (1996), can be used to elicit DA. Our elicitation method is 
parameter-free: it requires no assumption about utility and/or disappointment aversion. 
Quantitative tests of DA in three outcome domains, monetary gains, monetary losses, and 
life-years, suggest that the DA model is too parsimonious. Of the other models of 
disappointment aversion that have been proposed in the literature, our data are most 
consistent with the model of Loomes and Sugden (1986).  
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1. Introduction 
In response to the observed violations of expected utility, several generalizations 
of expected utility have been proposed (Starmer, 2000). Among these generalizations, 
Gul’s (1991) theory of Disappointment Aversion (DA) has several attractive features. 
First it is intuitive, being based on the idea that a decision maker when evaluating a 
prospect forms a prior expectation and experiences disappointment when the prospect 
results in an outcome that is worse than this prior expectation. Second, DA is analytically 
tractable. Third, DA is a parsimonious theory, being only one parameter richer than 
expected utility. This extra parameter reflects people’s disappointment aversion. DA’s 
parsimony is an important advantage in applications. A formal definition of the DA 
model, which explains the model’s characteristics in detail, is given in Section 2. 
Several other disappointment models exist which are based on similar intuitive 
idea as DA (Bell, 1985, Loomes and Sugden, 1986,  Grant and Kajii, 1998, Jia, Dyer, and 
Butler, 2001, Delquié and Cillo, 2006a,b). The class of preferences considered in these 
models is different from DA, however. The main difference is that in DA the decision 
maker’s prior expectation of a prospect is endogenously determined, whereas in the other 
disappointment models the prior expectation is exogenously determined. We will briefly 
consider these alternative models in Section 6. 
 In spite of its desirable features, DA has not been used in applications. One reason 
for this neglect might be that no straightforward procedure exists to elicit the model. 
Traditional utility measurement techniques, such as probability equivalence, certainty 
equivalence, and lottery equivalence (Farquhar, 1984, McCord and de Neufville, 1986), 
cannot be used because they are vulnerable to violations of expected utility. Wakker and 
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Deneffe (1996) developed the tradeoff method to measure utility when people behave 
according to rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 1981, Yaari, 1987), i.e., when they weight 
probabilities. We show that in the choices involved in the tradeoff method, DA is a 
special case of rank-dependent utility and, hence, the tradeoff method can also be used to 
elicit utility under DA. Once utility is known, the elicitation of the disappointment 
aversion parameter is straightforward. The tradeoff method allows to elicit the complete 
DA model and requires no assumptions about utility or disappointment aversion. 
 The availability of a procedure to elicit DA makes it possible to test the 
restrictions imposed by DA. We used data from Abdellaoui (2000) and Bleichrodt and 
Pinto (2000) to test DA. Taken together, these data allow a test of DA in three outcome 
domains, monetary gains, monetary losses, and life-years, using both hypothetical and 
incentivised questions. A priori there is some reason to doubt the descriptive validity of 
DA. As we show in Section 2, as a special case of rank-dependent utility, DA does not 
allow for the most commonly observed pattern of probability weighting. The test of DA 
is interesting nevertheless as the deviations from DA can suggest ways to extend the 
model. 
Previous evidence on the DA model yielded mixed results. Camerer and Ho 
(1994) tested betweenness, a central assumption of DA, and found systematic violations. 
Loomes and Segal (1994) tested the order of magnitude of decision makers’ attitudes 
towards risk and found no support for the pattern predicted by DA. Hey and Orme (1994) 
found that DA did not fit their data well. On the other hand, when Camerer and Ho 
(1994) allowed for random error and fitted stochastic choice models to their data, DA 
accommodated the data well and provided a comparable fit as prospect theory, the 
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leading descriptive theory of decision under risk. Morone and Schmidt (2002) found that, 
among expected utility and several important generalizations of expected utility, DA 
most accurately predicted willingness to accept and willingness to pay responses. 
Blavatskyy (2006) showed that most previously observed violations of betweenness 
could be explained by random errors. Harless and Camerer (1994) concluded that there is 
room for a theory that is richer than EU in the sense of being able to explain a few 
common violations of expected utility, but that is leaner than many of the generalizations 
of expected utility that allow a lot of patterns that are rarely observed. This description 
might fit DA. As noted above, the DA model is only one parameter richer than expected 
utility and the deviations from expected utility that it allows are commonly observed. For 
example, in the unit triangle DA allows for the commonly observed mixed fanning 
pattern, fanning in for relatively attractive prospects, i.e., prospects in the northwest 
corner of the triangle, and fanning out for relatively unattractive prospects, prospects in 
the southeast corner of the triangle (Chew and Waller, 1986, Conlisk, 1989, Neilson, 
1992, Starmer, 2000).  
A quantitative measurement of disappointment aversion is not only important for 
descriptive purposes, but also for applied decision analysis, where prescriptions have to 
be made. There is no consensus on the prescriptive status of disappointment models. 
Loomes and Sugden (1986) defend the normative status of disappointment. They argue 
that when people consistently maximize expected satisfaction where that expectation 
includes the anticipation of possible disappointment and elation, there is no reason why 
such a maximand would be irrational. Similar arguments have been put forward by Bell 
(1985) and Delquié and Cillo (2006a). Others, who have recognized the descriptive 
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limitations of expected utility have been more reluctant to abandon the normative validity 
of expected utility (e.g. Savage, 1954, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Irrespective of the 
prescriptive status of the DA model, it is important for applied decision analysis to be 
able to measure disappointment if disappointment affects decision makers’ preferences. 
This is clearly the case if the DA model is considered normative because then feelings of 
disappointment should be included in the analysis. However, it is also true if the DA 
model is merely considered descriptive. Prescriptive decision making require the 
measurement of utilities. Measuring utilities is a descriptive task and, hence, susceptible 
to the biases that lead to violations of expected utility. To correct for these biases a 
method is needed that can separate utility from other factors affecting preferences. Our 
measurement method allows such a separation between disappointment and utility. 
Hence, if disappointment affects a decision maker’s preferences and expected utility is 
considered normative then our method can be used to correct expected utilities for 
disappointment. As we explain in Section 3, our method can also be useful in the 
correction of utility measurements from traditional methods such as the probability 
equivalence and certainty equivalence methods. 
 The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the DA model and we 
show that for binary prospects DA is a special case of rank-dependent utility. In Section 3 
we describe how DA can be measured by the tradeoff method. Section  4 briefly 
describes how the data in Abdellaoui (2000) and Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), that we 
used to elicit and test DA, were collected. Section 5 presents the results. The data suggest 
that DA is too parsimonious. Rather than being constant, which is what DA predicts, 
disappointment aversion increases with the probability of obtaining an elation outcome. 
 7
In Section 6 we examine to what extent our findings are consistent with the other theories 
of disappointment aversion that have been proposed in the literature. We also performed 
a curve-fitting of a two-parameter functional form for disappointment aversion that 
allows for non-constant disappointment aversion. The results of this curve-fitting are 
mixed. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Disappointment Aversion Theory 
Let X be a set of outcomes, elements of which are denoted by x, y. We assume 
that outcomes are real numbers. In the experiments reported below, outcomes designate 
monetary gains and losses and life-years.  
Let P be the set of prospects. A typical prospect is denoted (p1:x1;…;pn:xn), 
yielding outcome xi with probability pi, i =  1,…,n, where the probabilities pi sum to one. 
A prospect is riskless if x1 = …= xn or if pi = 1 for some i. A preference relation í is 
defined over P. As usual, ê denotes the asymmetric part of í and ~ denotes its symmetric 
part. Preferences over outcomes are derived from preferences over riskless prospects. For 
convenience, we assume that í is monotonic: higher outcomes are preferred to lower 
outcomes. We denote prospects in a rank-ordered way, i.e., it is implicit in the notation 
(p1:x1;…;pn:xn) that x1 ≥ …≥ xn.  
Let q be any prospect (q1:x1;…;qn:xn). Then there will be some 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that 
for all i ≤ k, xi í q and for all i>k, qíxi. We can decompose q into prospects r = 
(r1:x1;…;rk:xk) and s = (sk+1:xk+1;…;sn:xn) such that q = αr + (1−α)s. Hence, all outcomes 
of r are at least as good as q and q is at least as good as all outcomes of s. The prospect r 
is the elation component of q, which is unambiguously better than q itself and the 
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prospect s is the disappointment component of q, which is unambiguously worse than q 
itself. The parameter α can be interpreted as the probability that an elation outcome 
obtains. Disappointment aversion theory (DA) holds if prospect q = (q1:x1;…;qn:xn) = αr 
+ (1−α)s is evaluated by  
 
γ(α) ∑ ki=1riU(xi) + ((1− γ(α)) ∑
n
i=k+1siU(xi)     (1) 
 
and preferences and choices correspond with this evaluation. In Eq. 1 U is a utility 
function from the set of outcomes to the reals and γ is a unique function from [0,1] to 
[0,1] defined by γ(α) = α1+(1−α)β  with β∈(−1,¶). The parameter β is the disappointment 
aversion parameter. Gul (1991) defined í to be disappointment averse if β ≥ 0 and 
elation loving if β∈(−1,0]. Gul (1991, Theorem 5) showed that, ceteris paribus, the more 
risk averse a decision maker is the higher is β. Expected utility is the special case of Eq. 1 
where β = 0. Equation 1 shows that β is the only parameter that the DA model adds to 
expected utility. Because disappointment aversion can be characterized through one 
parameter, disappointment aversion, unlike risk aversion, is a global property. Gul (1991, 
Theorem 2) showed that in the Allais paradox β > 0. In their parametric estimation of the 
DA functional, Hey and Orme (1994) observed both positive and negative estimates of β. 
For binary prospects (p:x;y), which give x with probability p and y with 
probability 1 − p, x ≥ y, the elation component is x, the disappointment component is y, 
and α = p so that the DA model reduces to  
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γ(p)U(x) + (1−γ(p))U(y).      (2) 
 
It is easy to verify that γ(0) = 0, γ(1) = 1 and that γ is increasing in p. Hence, γ satisfies 
the requirements for a probability weighting function in rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 
1981) and it follows from  Eq. 2 that, for binary prospects, DA reduces to a special form 
of rank-dependent utility.  
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Figure 1: Probability Weighting Functions
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The assumption that disappointment aversion is a global property implies 
restrictions on the shape of the probability weighting function when we consider DA as a 
special case of rank-dependent utility. Figure 1 displays the shape of the probability 
weighting function for several values of β. The figure shows that in DA the probability 
weighting function is either concave, implying overweighting of probabilities, when the 
decision maker is elation loving, or convex, implying underweighting of probabilities 
when the decision maker is disappointment averse. DA cannot accommodate a 
probability weighting function that has both concave and convex parts.  
Several empirical studies have shown, however, that the probability weighting 
function is commonly inverse S-shaped implying overweighting of small probabilities 
and underweighting of larger probabilities (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, Gonzalez 
and Wu, 1999, Abdellaoui, 2000, Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000) although convex 
probability weighting has also been observed (Jullien and Salanié, 2000, van de Kuilen, 
Wakker, and Zou, 2006). The inverse S-shape implies that people are particularly 
sensitive to small changes in probability from impossible to possible, a phenomenon 
referred to as the possibility effect, and from possible to certain, referred to as the 
certainty effect. The possibility effect and the certainty effect cannot be captured both by 
DA. DA is consistent with the possibility effect when the decision maker is elation loving 
and with the certainty effect when the decision maker is disappointment averse. If a 
decision maker behaves both according to the certainty effect and the possibility effect 
then we expect to find that the disappointment aversion parameter is not constant, but 
starts off negative and increases with the probability of the elation outcome. 
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3. The Tradeoff Method 
The elicitation procedure for DA consists of two stages. In the first stage the 
utility function is elicited. Given u(⋅), the second stage elicits the disappointment aversion 
parameter β from one single indifference. By eliciting several indifferences, we can test 
the stability of β and hence the validity of the DA model. As will become apparent, our 
elicitation imposes no assumptions on the utility function or on β. Hence, the elicitation 
and test of the DA model are parameter-free. 
 The elicitation of U and β was performed by the tradeoff method (Wakker and 
Deneffe, 1996). Wakker and Deneffe showed that the tradeoff method elicits valid 
utilities under rank-dependent utility. The tradeoff method only uses binary prospects 
and, as we showed in Section 2, for binary prospects, DA is a special case of rank-
dependent utility. Therefore, the tradeoff method can also be used to elicit the utility 
function under DA.  
 
3.1 Elicitation of Utility 
The first step in the tradeoff method is to fix two gauge outcomes R and r, a 
starting outcome x0 and a probability p. A value x1 is elicited so that the subject is 
indifferent between (p:x0; R) and (p:x1; r). We then substitute the elicited number x1 for 
x0 and elicit the value x2 so that the subject is indifferent between (p:x1; R) and (p:x2; r). 
By repeating this procedure, a standard sequence x0, x1,…,xk results where for 
j∈{1,…,k} we have (p:xj−1; R) ~ (p:xj; r). For monetary gains and life-years, we chose the 
gauge outcomes R and r so that R > r. It follows that the standard sequence is increasing, 
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i.e., x0 <….< xk. For monetary losses, we chose r > R and the standard sequence is 
decreasing, i.e., x0 > x1 >…> xk.  
Evaluating the indifferences (p:xj−1; R) ~ (p:xj; r) gives by DA  
  
γ(p)U(xj−1) + (1−γ(p))U(R) = γ(p)U(xj) + (1−γ(p))U(r)   (3) 
 
or 
 
U(xj)−U(xj−1) = 1−γ(p) γ(p)  (U(R)−U(r)).      (4) 
 
Since this holds for all j in {1,…,k}, the utility difference between two successive 
elements of the standard sequence is constant.  
For monetary gains and life-years, we normalized utility so that U(x0) = 0 and 
U(xk) =1. It follows that U(xj) = j/k, j = 0,…,k. For monetary losses, we normalized 
utility so that U(x0) = 0 and U(xk) = −1 and, therefore, U(xj) = −j/k, j = 0,…,k. 
 
3.2 Elicitation of Disappointment Aversion 
After the elicitation of the utility function through the construction of a standard 
sequence x0, x1,…,xk, the only remaining parameter that needs to be assessed is the 
disappointment aversion parameter β. Suppose that the standard sequence is increasing. 
The most straightforward method to elicit β is to fix an element xj of the standard 
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sequence and then to elicit the probability pj that makes the subject indifferent between xj 
for sure and the prospect (pj:xk; x0). It follows from DA that 
 
U(xj) = γ(pj)U(xk) + (1−γ(pj))U(x0),      (5) 
 
or  γ(pj) = U(xj)−U(x0) U(xk)−U(x0)  = j/k. When the standard sequence is decreasing, then the 
probability pj is elicited that makes the subject indifferent between xj and (pj:x0; xk). This 
indifference implies by DA that γ(pj) = k − jk  .  
The resulting disappointment aversion parameter is given by 
 
β = pj − γ(pj) γ(pj)(1 − pj) .        (6) 
 
By varying xj we can elicit different observations of β. As noted in Section 2, DA 
predicts that the elicited values of β are all equal; any differences must due to random 
error.  
 A disadvantage of the above procedure may be that the question format and the 
response scale differ between the first stage, the elicitation of the utility function, and the 
second stage, the elicitation of the disappointment aversion parameter. In the first stage, 
both prospects are risky and the response scale is outcome (xj), in the second stage one of 
the prospects is riskless and the response scale is probability (pj). Several studies suggest 
that varying the response scale may lead to distortions in the elicited preferences 
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(Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic, 1988, Delquié, 1993). One way to mitigate the effect of 
such distortions is to obfuscate that probability is the response scale, for example by 
eliciting indifference through a sequence of choices. 
An alternative procedure to elicit the disappointment aversion parameter, which 
holds the question format and the response scale fixed across the two stages and, 
therefore, may be less susceptible to distortions, is the following. Fix three different 
elements of the standard sequence that was elicited in the first stage, say xj1, xj2, xj3 with 
xj1 < xj2 < xj3. Also fix a probability p. Then elicit the outcome z so that the client is 
indifferent between (p:xj3; xj2) and (p:z; xj1). It follows from DA that  
 
γ(p) = 
j2
k  − 
j1
k 
(U(z) − j3k ) + (
j2
k  −
j1
k ) 
        (7) 
 
and the formula for β follows from  Eq. 6. A test of DA is obtained by varying the  
probability p across questions, thereby eliciting several values of β. Again, DA predicts 
that the obtained values are all equal, except for random error. 
 A disadvantage of the second elicitation procedure is that U(z) is in general 
unknown and has to be determined through interpolation. As long as successive elements 
of the standard sequence are relatively close this will cause no problems.  
A potential problem of both approaches is error propagation: an error made during 
the elicitation of the utility function affects the elicitation of subsequent elements of the 
standard sequence and of the disappointment aversion parameter. Abdellaoui (2000) and 
Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) showed that error propagation caused no problems for the 
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elicitation of the probability weighting function, and thus of β, by the two methods 
described above (see also Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber, 2005).  
 
3.3. Use of our Method in Applications 
 The above procedure requires that outcomes are quantitative. For qualitative 
outcomes like health states the trade-off method cannot be applied. The way to proceed 
for such outcomes is as follows. First apply our method for quantitative outcomes to 
determine β. For example, in the health domain one could determine β by using life 
durations as outcomes. Knowledge of β can then be used to correct traditional utility 
measurements for disappointment. Consider, for example, the probability equivalence 
method, which is widely used in medical decision making to determine the utility of 
health states. A common question in medical decision making is to ask a patient to 
specify the probability p that makes him indifferent between a given impaired health 
state, say back pain, for sure and a treatment option that gives probability p of full health 
and probability 1 − p of death within a week. Under expected utility and the scaling 
U(full health) =1 and U(death within a week) = 0 it follows that the utility of back pain is 
equal to p. The same scaling implies that under the DA model the utility of back pain is 
equal to γ(p). Knowledge of β determines γ(p) and allows to reassess existing utility 
measurements and to correct these for disappointment so as to arrive at more realistic 
utilities for health.  
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4. Experiments  
4.1. First Experiment: Monetary Gains and Losses 
The first elicitation / test of the DA model that we performed used the data from 
Abdellaoui (2000). In this study, monetary outcomes were used. Forty French 
undergraduate and Ph.D. students in economics participated, who were paid FF 150 
(approximately €23) for their participation. Separate elicitations of U and β were 
performed for gains and for losses. Subjects were told that for gains one subject would be 
randomly selected to play for real money one of his answers in the first stage of the 
elicitation and one of his answers in the second stage of the elicitation. For losses a 
similar incentive mechanism is ethically objectionable and, hence, no real incentives 
were used for losses.  
To elicit the utility function, the outcomes |x0|, |R|, and |r| were fixed at FF 1000 
(€150), FF 500 (€75), and 0 respectively. The probability p was set equal to ⅔. Standard 
sequences of seven elements, x0, x1,…,x6, were constructed. Hence, subjects faced the 
options (⅔:xj; 500) and (⅔:xj+1; 0) for gains and the options (⅓:−500; xj) and (⅓:0; xj+1) 
for losses, j = 0,…,5.  As has been mentioned before, the standard sequences were 
increasing for gains and decreasing for losses. Indifferences between the options were 
elicited by a choice-based procedure. 
To elicit β, the first procedure described in Section 3.2 was used, where, to avoid 
distortions, the indifference probabilities were elicited by a choice-based procedure. Each 
subject was asked a series of choices aiming to determine the probabilities p1.,,,,p5 that 
made him indifferent between xj and (pj:x6;x0) for gains and between xj and (pj:x0;x6) for 
losses, j = 1,…,5. Several consistency questions were included, which indicated no 
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systematic inconsistencies. A more detailed description of the experimental procedure is 
given in Abdellaoui (2000). 
 
4.2. Second Experiment: Life-Years  
The second elicitation/test of the DA model used the data from Bleichrodt and 
Pinto (2000). The outcomes in this study were life-years. Fifty-one Spanish 
undergraduate economics students participated, who were paid Ptas 5000 (approximately 
€30). Obviously, real incentives could not be used.  
Prospects were described as medical treatments. Subjects were asked to imagine 
that they displayed symptoms that implied that they had one of two diseases; it was 
unknown from which disease they suffered. Subjects were asked to choose between two 
treatments to cure the symptoms. 
To elicit the utility function, the outcomes x0, R, and r were fixed at 0 years, 55 
years, and 45 years respectively. Hence, in the second experiment the gauge outcomes 
were more attractive than the elements of the standard sequence. This does not affect the 
conclusions of Section 3.1 as long as r is at least as large as the final element of the 
standard sequence. The probability p was set equal to ½. Standard sequences of seven 
elements, x0, x1,…,x6, were constructed. Hence, subjects faced the options (½:55 years;xj) 
and (½:45 years;xj+1), j = 0,…,5. Indifferences were elicited by matching. 
To elicit β, the second procedure described in Section 3.2. was used. The utility of 
z was estimated both by linear interpolation and by interpolation based on a power 
function estimated from the data of the first stage (the utility elicitation). Five 
probabilities pi were used: 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.90. For probabilities 0.10, 0.25, 
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and 0.50, subjects were asked to state their indifference value z in the comparison 
between (p:x4;x3) and (p:x5;z).2 For probabilities 0.75 and 0.90, subjects were asked to 
state their indifference value z in the comparison between (p:x3;x2) and (p:z;x1). The 
value of β then followed from Eqs. 6 and 7. Several consistency questions were included. 
They indicated no systematic inconsistencies. A more detailed description of the 
experimental procedure is given in Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000).  
 
5. Results  
All responses were included in the analysis of the first experiment. In the analysis 
of the second experiment, the responses of two subjects were discarded. One subject 
refused to make any trade-offs, for the other subject x6 > 45 years = r.  
 
5.1. Utility 
 Figure 2 displays the elicited utility functions across the three outcome domains. 
The figure shows that the utility function is mildly concave for gains, mildly convex for 
losses, and concave for life-years. To smoothen out response errors, for each subject a 
parametric estimation of the utility function was performed where it was assumed that the 
utility function was a power function. The power function was chosen because previous 
studies observed that it provided an excellent fit to the data. Median power coefficients 
were 0.89 for gains, 0.92 for losses and 0.77 for life-years.  
 
                                                 
2 Then γ(p) = ½ − u(z)⅔ − u(z) . 
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Figure 2: Elicited Utility Functions for Gains, Losses, and Life-Years 
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 The aggregate data were confirmed by individual-subject analysis. Both for 
monetary gains and for life-years, most subjects had a concave utility function. For both 
outcome domains, there were significantly more subjects with concave than subjects with 
convex utility functions (p < 0.01, binomial, one-tailed). For monetary losses, the modal 
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shape of the utility function was convex. There were significantly more convex utility 
functions than concave utility functions (p = 0.025, binomial, one-tailed). Further details, 
e.g. with respect to the classification used, are in Abdellaoui (2000) and in Bleichrodt and 
Pinto (2000). 
 
5.2. Disappointment Aversion 
 Table 1 gives an overview of the individual results. The table shows that for each 
of the three outcome domains the proportion of disappointment averse subjects, i.e. those 
for whom β > 0, increased with the probability of the elation outcome. That 
disappointment aversion increases with the probability of the elation outcome seems 
intuitive. If the probability of success is small, people will not really count on it and will 
feel little disappointment when the elation outcome does not obtain. If the probability of 
success is high, people will feel more disappointed when the elation outcome does not 
obtain.  
 
Table 1: Proportion of disappointment averse subjects 
Elicitation Gains Losses Life-Years 
1 37.5% 5% 4.2% 
2 57.5% 22.5% 25.6% 
3 75% 40% 74.5% 
4 90% 52.5% 83.7% 
5 97.5% 72.5% 91.3% 
Note: for gains and losses elicitation j measured  pj = w−1(j/6), j = 1,..,5. For life-years elicitation j measured 
w(pj) with p1,…,p5 = 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90. 
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Figure 3 plots the probabilities and the median values for the disappointment 
aversion parameter β for gains, losses, and life-years. For life-years only the relationship 
under linear interpolation is displayed. The relationship under power interpolation is 
similar. 
  
Figure 3: Elicited Values of the Disappointment Aversion Parameter. 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Probability
B
et
a
Gains Losses Life-Years
 
Figure 3 confirms the individual data and shows that β is not constant at the 
aggregate level either. The hypothesis of constant β is rejected for all outcome domains 
(p < 0.001 both by ANOVA with repeated measures and by the nonparametric Friedman 
test). Since expected utility is the special case of DA where β = 0, the data also reject 
expected utility. 
In terms of the probability weighting function, the finding that disappointment 
aversion increases with the probability of the elation outcome entails that the data are 
consistent with a probability weighting function that overweights small probabilities and 
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underweights large probabilities, and thus with the joint existence of the possibility effect 
and the certainty effect.  
 Table 1 and Figure 3 suggest that, for the probabilities considered, disappointment 
aversion is higher for gains than for losses. Sign-dependence of the disappointment 
aversion parameter is confirmed by a signed rank-test (z = −3.42, p = 0.001). The median 
disappointment aversion parameter also differs significantly between gains and life-years 
(z =  − 4.32, p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney Test). No significant differences were found 
between losses and life-years (z = −1.485, p = 0.138, Mann-Whitney Test). In comparing 
the results for money amounts and for life-years, one should keep in mind that the 
procedure for eliciting β was different for money than for life duration. This difference in 
elicitation procedure may have confounded the comparison. We return to this issue in 
Section 7. 
 
6. Other Disappointment Models 
 Let us now briefly consider the question whether the other disappointment models 
that have been proposed in the literature can account for our finding that disappointment 
aversion, and, hence, risk aversion, increases with the probability of the elation 
component. A caveat that should be kept in mind in performing such an analysis is that 
our method was not specifically designed to elicit these other disappointment theories.  
 Bell (1985) proposed the following functional form for a binary prospect (p:x;y), 
x > y,  
px + (1 − p)y + (e − d)p(1 − p)(x − y),     (8) 
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where e is a constant reflecting the degree to which a unit of elation affects the decision 
maker and d is a constant that reflects the degree to which a unit of disappointment 
affects a decision maker. Equation 7 can be rewritten as w(p)x + (1 − w(p))y with  
w(p) = (p + (e − d)p(1 − p)).        (9) 
Bell’s model is a special form of rank-dependent utility with linear utility and the 
probability weighting function given by Eq. 9. It is obvious from this equation that w(p) 
either underweights or overweights probabilities but cannot account for the inverse S-
shape. Consequently, our data are not consistent with Bell’s model of disappointment 
aversion and neither with the model of Jia et al. (2001), which is identical to Bell’s model 
for two outcome prospects. The model of Grant and Kajii (1998) corresponds to rank-
dependent utility with a power probability function w(p) = pα and can only account for 
underweighting of probabilities, i.e. disappointment aversion. Therefore, their model is 
not consistent with our data either. 
 Delquié and Cillo (2006a) suggested that (p:x;y) be evaluated as  
pu(x) + p(1 − p)E(u(x) − u(y)) + (1 − p)u(y) − (1 − p)pD (u(x) − u(y)),  (10) 
where E is a real-valued function capturing sensitivity to elation and D is a real-valued 
function capturing sensitivity to disappointment. Both E and D are nondecreasing and 
satisfy E(0) = D(0) = 0. Delquié and Cillo’s model cannot account for the increasing 
relationship between disappointment aversion and the probability of the elation 
component: disappointment aversion is the same when the probability of the elation 
component is, say, 0.10 as when it is 0.90. Hence, Delquié and Cillo’s model cannot 
account for our data. 
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 Finally, Loomes and Sugden (1986) proposed the following functional form for 
the evaluation of (p:x;y) 
pu(x) + pD(u(x) − (pu(x) + (1 −p)u(y))) + (1 − p)u(y) +     
(1 − p)D(u(y) − (pu(x) + (1 −p)u(y))) =      
pu(x) + pD((1 − p)(u(x) − u(y))) + (1 − p)u(y) − (1 − p)D(p(u(x) − u(y))).  (11) 
In Loomes and Sugden’s model the prior expectation of a prospect is its expected utility. 
The function D captures sensitivity to elation when the utility of an outcome is larger 
than the prior expectation and sensitivity to disappointment when the utility of an 
outcome is less than the prior expectation. D is nondecreasing, satisfies D(0) = 0 and 
D(−x) = −D(x) for all x > 0, and is convex on its positive domain and concave on its 
negative domain. Under these assumptions Loomes and Sugden’s (1986) model predicts 
that disappointment aversion increases with the probability of the elation component x, a 
prediction that is in accord with our data. 
Loomes and Sugden’s (1986) model is more sophisticated, however, than the DA 
model and there exists as yet no method to elicit their model. We therefore explored 
whether adding one additional parameter to the DA model, which reflects how 
disappointment aversion varies with the probability of obtaining an elation outcome, 
could account for our data. This extended DA model is still tractable and may suggest 
ways to generalize the DA model. Of the two-parameter functional forms  that we 
examined (linear, quadratic, power, exponential, expo-power (Saha, 1993), and HARA 
(Merton, 1971)) the exponential form β = a + ebα, where α is the probability of obtaining 
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an elation outcome, fitted the data best based on the criterion “minimize the sum of the 
squared errors subject to β > −1.”   
The curve-fitting yielded mixed results. As Table 2 shows, the median estimates 
for b were differed substantially across the three domains. The difference was significant 
between losses and gains (p =0.012); the other differences were not significant. There 
was a lot of variation in the elicited values of b at the individual level. The fit was good 
for losses and for life-years, but less so for gains. 
 
Table 2: Parameter estimates for the exponential form β = a + ebp. Interquartile 
ranges of individual parameters of a and b are in parentheses 
 a b 
Gains −1.06 
(−1.97, 0.62) 
1.62 
(0.80, 2.74) 
Losses −1.70 
(−1.99, −1.40) 
0.50 
(0.05, 1.82) 
Life-Years −1.79 
(−1.99, −1.60) 
1.33 
(0.67, 1.77) 
 
7. Conclusion. 
 This paper has proposed a method to measure DA, a popular nonexpected utility 
model that generalizes expected utility by adding one parameter. The availability of an 
elicitation method is important both for descriptive purposes, to test the descriptive 
accuracy of the DA model, and for applications as our method allows separating utility 
and disappointment. Moreover, knowledge of the disappointment parameter β makes it 
possible to correct utility measurements using traditional measurement tools, such as the 
probability equivalence and certainty equivalence methods, for disappointment. 
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 Our descriptive test of the DA model showed that disappointment aversion is not 
constant, as DA assumes, but varies with the probability of the elation outcome. This 
pattern appears robust: we found it both for monetary and for health outcomes, both for 
gains and for losses, and both for hypothetical and for incentivised questions. We found 
evidence of sign-dependence of disappointment aversion: disappointment aversion was 
higher for gains than for losses. Evidence on outcome-dependence was less clear. The 
conclusions about outcome-dependence are necessarily tentative as the elicitation 
processes differed for money outcomes and for life duration. The extent these differences 
confound the comparison between the two domains is unclear. It is well known that 
preference measurements are generally volatile and depend on the way preferences are 
measured. On the other hand the different elicitation procedures need not lead to 
systematic biases in the elicited values of the disappointment parameter. Consider for 
example scale compatibility, which says that the decision maker will overweight the 
response scale used. If probability is used as the response scale, scale compatibility 
predicts that subjects will focus more on the probabilities in responding to the questions 
than when outcome is used as the response scale. Scale compatibility does not predict on 
which probability subjects will focus. If they focus on the probability of the elation 
outcome then the disappointment parameter will be lower than when they focus on the 
probability of the disappointment outcome. The potential bias arising from the difference 
in elicitation procedure is ambiguous.  
 Of the other disappointment models that have been proposed in the literature, our 
data are only consistent with the model of Loomes and Sugden (1986). Our method for 
measuring the DA model does not apply to Loomes and Sugden’s model, however, and 
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restraint should be exercised in drawing strong inferences about the validity of the other 
disappointment models based on our data alone. Future research may try to construct a 
method that allows measuring Loomes and Sugden’s model to obtain a proper test of that 
theory and to improve its applicability. 
Another possibility would be to generalize the DA model by allowing 
disappointment aversion to vary with the probability of the elation outcome, while 
keeping the model tractable. We performed some preliminary analysis on this topic by 
fitting two-parameter functional forms to our data. The findings of our curve-fitting 
exercise are mixed: they are more satisfactory for losses and life-years than for gains. An 
interesting test that may be addressed in future research is whether the fitted curves are 
consistent with other available data and how well they predict choices between prospects 
involving more than two outcomes. 
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